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Every industrial production, particularly chemical processing, demands special attention in con-
ducting the technological process with regard to the security requirements. For this reason, pro-
duction processes should be continuously monitored by means of control and alarm safety
instrumented systems. Inthe production of nitric acid at Petrokemija d. d., the original alarm safe-
ty system was designed as a combination of an electrical relay safety system and transistorized
alarm module system. In order to increase safety requirements and modernize the technological
process of nitric acid production, revamping and upgrading of the existing alarm safety system
was initiated with a new microprocessor system. The newly derived alarm safety system, Simatic
PCS 7, links the function of “classically” distributed control (DCS) and logical systems in a com-
mon hardware and software platform with integrated engineering tools and operator interface to
meet the minimum safety standards with safety integrity level 2 (SIL2) up to level 3 (SIL3), accor-
ding to IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. This professional paper demonstrates the methodology of
upgrading the logic of the alarm safety system in the production of nitric acid in the form of a logi-
cal diagram, which was the basis for a further step in its design and construction. Based on the
mentioned logical diagram and defined security requirements, the project was implemented in
three phases: analysis and testing, installation of the safety equipment and system, and commis-
sioning. Developed also was a verification system of all safety conditions, which could be applied
to other facilities for production of nitric acid. With the revamped and upgraded interlock alarm
safetysystem,anewandimprovedsafetyboundaryintheproductionofnitricacidwasset,which
created the foundation for further improvement of the production process in terms of improved
analysis.
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Introduction
The industrial process of nitric acid production is a very de-
manding process from the standpoint of security require-
ments.Specialattentionmustbegiventopowerrecoveryin
the turboset and reactor section. The turboset is a mechani-
cal device for the rotation of air and the nitrous oxide com-
pressors. In the reactor section, special precautions must be
taken regarding the exothermal oxidation reactions in the
gaseous mixture of ammonia and air. In order to prevent di-
sastrous unintended consequences and hazards, the nitric
acid production process must be continuously monitored
with the help of control and alarm safety instrumented sy-
stems. A control system is deemed safety-related if it provi-
des functions that significantly reduce the risk of a hazard,
and in combination with other risk reduction measures re-
duces the overall risk to a tolerable level. These functions
are known as safety functions of the system or device, and
are able to prevent initiation of a hazard or detect the onset
of one, in order to take the necessary actions to terminate
the hazardous event, achieve a safe state, or mitigate the
consequences of a hazard. All elements of the system,
which are required to perform the safety function, inclu-
ding utilities, are safety-related and should be considered
part of the safety-related system. Due to the unreliability of
the originally installed alarm safety system in nitric acid pro-
duction at Petrokemija d. d., which consisted of electrical
relay safety system and transistorized alarm modules, it had
to be revamped and upgraded with a new microprocessor
system. Replacement of the existing system consisted of
three phases, i.e. the analysis and testing phase, implemen-
tation and operation, and maintenance. All three phases
were conducted in compliance with the international stan-
dards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, the standards for the func-
tional safety of safety-instrumented systems.1,2 In the analy-
sis phase, the existing and potential new safety risks were
identified. According to the results of these analyses, the ar-
chitecture of the logical system was made in the shape of a
logical diagram, which was the basis for the safety require-
ments specification of the safety-instrumented system. By
means of the safety requirements specifications, and the
hazard and operability method,3 the required safety inte-
grity level was defined as a measure of risk reduction that
the safety instrumented functions have to deliver. The
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tecture and related software for implementing safety func-
tions. The newly selected alarm safety system was Simatic
PCS 7 with a safety matrix, which enables safety lifecycle
management for safety applications up to safety integrity le-
vel 3. The alarm system was developed in accordance with
the guidance prescribed in the EEMUA 1914 and CHID Cir-
cular CC Tech safety 9.5 After the phase of designing and
planning, followed the phase of installation, testing, staff
training, commissioning, and validation of the nitric acid fa-
cility. The installed alarm safety system also became the ba-
sis for the second phase of revamping and upgrading the
controlsystem,whichisstillconductedbymeansofapneu-
matic control system.
Experimental
With respect to the existing P&I diagrams of the nitric acid
plant, first of all the existing and potential hazardous risks in
the production process of the facility were identified, fol-
lowed by the procedure of the hazard and operability met-
hod.Onthebasisoftheidentifiedhazardousrisksituations,
a logical diagram was made which served for preparation of
the safety cause&effect matrix6 and determination of the sa-
fety integrity level. The functioning of the logical diagram
was first checked with the help of very simple free software,
Cedar LS. Cedar LS is an interactive digital logic simulator
used in digital logic design classes, or for testing simple digi-
tal designs. It features both low-level logic objects, as well as
some register-level functions. After the phase of analyzing
and testing all the possible hazardous situations and deter-
miningtherequiredsafetyintegritylevelwiththehelpofsa-
fety instrumented functions and risk graph, an alarm safety
system was selected. The system consists of 3 kVA (cos()=
0.9, 2700 W) uninterruptible power supply with autonomy
of 30 min, two redundant central process units CPU 417-4H
withintegratedsafetyfunction,4I/OracksET200Mwithre-
dundant profibus DP interface whose details are presented
in Table 1, industrial ethernet (system bus, terminal bus),
and operator interface in the shape of combined opera-
tor/engineering station and operator station.
In the erection phase, the old Praxis electrical-relay safety
system and transistorized alarm modules system were re-
placed with the mentioned system. This was followed by
the phase of cold and real testing in which the verification
system of all safety conditions was implemented. The final
phase was staff training for performing the tasks with the
new operator interface.
Results and discussion
The originally installed alarm safety system was a combina-
tion of an electrical relay safety system and a transistorized
alarm module system designed by the company Praxis. Ac-
cording to the safety requirements in the 1960's, this alarm
safety system facilitated the following functions: logic inputs
and outputs for the first failure sequence, motor off opera-
tion, control by normal open contact, and alarm signal re-
petition with visual and sound control.
The old system does not have the necessary diagnostic tools
for determination of the first failure sequence and it was
therefore almost impossible to carry out corrective measu-
res in case of malfunction. At the same time, the overall
maintenance of the equipment was very difficult due to the
lack of adequate spare parts. In order to increase the safety
requirements and modernize the technological process of
nitric acid production, revamping and upgrading of the exi-
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Table 1 – Details of the I/O racks ET200M with redundant
profibus DP interface
Tablica 1 – Tehnièke karakteristike I/O modula ET200M s
redundantnimkomunikacijskimprotokolom“profibus”isuèeljemDP
No. of the
I/O rack
ET200M
Red. br.
modula I/O
ET200M
Properties of the rack
Tehnièke karakteristike modula
No. of the
modules/
signals
Broj
modula/
signala
Rack 1
Modul 1
failsafe digital input SM 326
F-DI 24 × DC 24 V;1×4 0P I N
sigurnosni digitalni ulaz SM 326
F-DI 24 × DC 24 V;1×4 0P I N
4/96
failsafe digital output SM 326
F-DO 10 × DC 24V/2AP P ;1×4 0P I N
sigurnosni digitalni izlaz SM 326
F-DO 10 × DC 24 V/2 A PP;1×4 0P I N
4/40
failsafe analog input SM 336
6A I ;1 5B I T ;1×2 0P I N
sigurnosni analogni ulaz SM 336
6A I ;1 5B I T ;1×2 0P I N
1/6
Rack 2
Modul 2
standard digital input SM 321
3 2D I ;2 4VD C ;1×4 0P I N
standardni digitalni ulaz SM321
3 2D I ;2 4VD C ;1×4 0P I N
4/128
standard digital output SM 322
32 DO; 24 V DC, 0.5 A; 1 × 40 PIN
standardni digitalni izlaz SM 322
32 DO; 24 V DC, 0,5 A; 1 × 40 PIN
2/64
standard analog input SM 331
8A E ;±5/1 0V ,1–5V ,±2 0m A ,
0/4t o2 0m A
1×4 0P I N
standardni analogni ulaz SM 331
8A E ;±5/1 0 V ,1–5V ,±2 0m A ,
0/4t o2 0m A
1×4 0P I N
3/24
standardni analogni izlaz SM 332
8 AO; U/I; 1 × 40 PIN
standard analog output SM 332
8 AO; U/I; 1 × 40 PIN
1/8
Rack 3
Modul 3
standard analog input SM 331
8 AI thermocouple/4A IPt100;
1×2 0P I N
for EX areas
standardni analogni ulaz SM 331
8 AI termoèlanak/4A IPt100;1×2 0P I N
za zone EX
3/24
Rack 4
Modul 4
standard analog input SM 331
8 AI thermocouple/4A IPt100;
1×2 0P I N
for EX areas
standardni analogni ulaz SM 331
8 AI termoèlanak/4A IPt100;1×2 0P I N
za zone EX
3/24sting alarm safety system was initiated with the new micro-
processor system. The main role of the process engineer
was to determine all the possible security requirements and
safety standards in the production of nitric acid that could
trigger hazardous situations. This was achieved in the analy-
sis phase in which the logical diagram was built. The deri-
ved logical diagram was the foundation for all other tasks.
Taking into consideration the security conditions of the old
alarm safety system and all other process conditions in the
nitric acid production plant, two different sets of defects
were identified: defects I and II. Defects I represent the
most serious defects in the production of nitric acid, after
which the emergency shutdown procedure of the whole
process (turboset and process unit) must be conducted as
soon as possible. In the case of defects II, the procedure of
the process unit’s shutdown must be first implemented,
while the power recovery by the turboset may stay running
for 3 minutes in order to ensure proper blowdown of the all
parts of the equipment and pipes in the nitric acid produc-
tion process unit. The onset of defects I or II will cause ap-
propriate security effects in the production of nitric acid.
This will cause the protection of process equipment and
process staff in order to avoid every possible hazardous si-
tuation. Table 2 shows the main causes and effects, which
bring about the emergency shutdown sequence. Table 3
depicts the same for a normal shutdown sequence. Each
cause will automatically trigger simultaneously all the ef-
fects listed in the right column of Table 2 and Table 3.
Besides the mentioned protection and safety causes and ef-
fects, the alarm states, trips and interlocks for process para-
meters are also recognized, which must be a forewarning to
the operator to take necessary action to prevent unwanted
shutdown effects. The alarm system is designed according
to all the standard conditions and is equipped with audible
and visual signs, proper alarm lists, etc. Protective tripping
system is designed as a defence against any excursions
beyond the safe operating limits. At the same time, it de-
tects any excursions beyond the set points related to safe
operating limits (i.e. the onset of a hazard) and acts
promptly to maintain or restore the equipment under con-
trol to a safe state.
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Table 2 – The main causes and effects which initiate the emergency shutdown procedure in the production of nitric acid
Tablica 2 – Glavni uzroci nuÞnih postupaka obustave proizvodnje dušiène kiseline i s njima povezane posljedice
Possible causes
Moguæi uzroci
Effects
Posljedice
emergency STOP pushbutton in the control room
tipkalo za nuÞdu STOP u komandnoj sobi
1. closing of the two electrical solenoid valves of gaseous
ammonia pipe and opening of the start-up relief valve before it
zatvaranje dvaju elektriènih solenoidnih ventila na cjevovodu
plinovitog amonijaka i otvaranje odušnog ventila ispred njih
2. closing of the extraction valve of nitric acid from absorption
tower
zatvaranje ventila za crpljenje kiseline iz apsorpcijske kolone
3. closing of the quenching water inlet valve before steam
superheaters
zatvaranje ulaznog ventila vode za hlaðenje pare prije
predgrijaèa
4. stop of recirculation pump for steam superheaters
zaustavljanje recirkulacijske crpke za predgrijaèe pare
5. emergency shutdown procedure of the turboset, quick trip,
which consists of:
nuÞna obustava rada turboseta koju èine:
5.1. closing the steam inlet valve for steam turbine
zatvaranje ulaznog ventila pare za parnu turbinu
5.2. opening the relief valve of air compressor to the atmosphere
otvaranje ventila za rastereæenje zraènog kompresora prema
atmosferi
5.3. opening the relief valve of nitrous gas compressor to the
atmosphere
otvaranje ventila za rastereæenje kompresora dušikovih oksida
prema atmosferi
5.4. closing the inlet valve for tail gas turbine
zatvaranje ulaznog ventila za plinski ekspander
5.5. opening the by-pass valve of tail gas turbine for its relief
otvaranje obilaznog ventila za rastereæenje plinskog
ekspandera
6. closing of the control valve of liquid ammonia for the DeNOx
system – the cause marked with ** triggers only this effect
zatvaranje kontrolnog ventila tekuæeg amonijaka za sustav
za uklanjanje NOx – uzrok oznaèen s ** izaziva samo ovu
posljedicu
emergency STOP pushbutton at the local control panel of turboset
tipkalo za nuÞdu STOP na lokalnoj komandnoj ploèi turboseta
electrical power failure
nestanak elektriène energije
steam turbine overspeed
prekoraèenje brzine vrtnje parne turbine
tailgas turbine overspeed
prekoraèenje brzine vrtnje plinskog ekspandera
axial displacement of air compressor rotor
aksijalni pomak rotora zraènog kompresora
axial displacement of nitrous gas compressor rotor
aksijalni pomak rotora kompresora dušikovih oksida
axial displacement of steam turbine rotor
aksijalni pomak rotora parne turbine
axial displacement of tailgas turbine rotor
aksijalni pomak rotora plinskog ekspandera
low pressure of lubrication oil for the turboset
nizak tlak ulja za podmazivanje turboseta
too low pressure in the steam turbine condenser
prenizak tlak u kondenzatoru parne turbine
low temperature of tail gas before the DeNOx reactor**
niska temperatura otpadnog plina prije reaktora
za uklanjanje NOx**
low temperature of tail gas after the tailgas turbine**
niska temperatura otpadnog plina nakon plinskog ekspandera**Trips are not self-resetting unless adequate justification has
been made. Protective interlocks are conducted to prevent
those control actions, which might initiate a hazard from
being undertaken, by an operator or process control sy-
stem, and are by nature self-resetting. The possible alarm
states, trips and interlocks are presented in Table 4. The list
of alarm states, trips and interlocks refers to the common
states for both production lines and for each separately. Re-
garding the phase of analysis of all the possible hazardous
process states in the nitric acid production, which have
been identified until now, a logical diagram was made. It
determines the recognized causes and consequential safety
effects of the security equipment and devices.
The constructed logical diagram is shown in Fig. 1, in which
every possible hazardous state, shown in Table 2 and Table
3, is clearly represented. These possible causes were imple-
mented into an interactive digital logic simulator, Cedar LS,
in order to verify the correctness and performance of the
constructed logical diagram. After the phase of testing the
logical diagram, the safety integrity level in the selection
process was determined using the safety instrumented
functions and risk graph technique7,8,9,10,11 in a systematic
team approach. First of all, the list of the safety-instrumen-
ted functions12 was analyzed and identified. In nitric acid
production, in compliance with the prescribed safety in-
structions, the following safety instrumented functions were
identified:
1. Consequence severity of an accident being prevented
– C function
2. Pre-safeguard likelihood of an accident – W function
3. Occupancy in the hazardous zone – F function
4. Probability of avoiding a hazardous event – P function
The required risk reduction can take place by any combina-
tion of safeguards, either instrumented or non-instrumen-
ted. The required risk reduction is a value that defines the
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Table 3 – Main causes and effects which initiate normal shutdown procedure in the production of nitric acid
Tablica 3 – Glavni uzroci i posljedice koji uzrokuju normalni postupak obustave proizvodnje dušiène kiseline
Possible causes
Moguæi uzroci
Effects
Posljedice
very high level of liquid ammonia in the ammonia evaporator
vrlo visoka razina tekuæeg amonijaka u isparivaèu amonijaka
1. closing of the two electrical solenoid valves at the pipe of
gaseous ammonia and opening of the start-up relief valve
before it
zatvaranje dvaju elektriènih solenoidnih ventila na cjevovodu
plinovitog amonijaka i otvaranje odušnog ventila ispred njih
2. closing of the extraction valve of nitric acid from the
absorption tower
zatvaranje ventila za crpljenje kiseline iz apsorpcijske kolone
3. closing of the quenching water inlet valve before the steam
superheaters
zatvaranje ulaznog ventila vode za hlaðenje pare prije
predgrijaèa
4. stop of recirculation pump for steam superheaters
zaustavljanje recirkulacijske crpke za predgrijaèe pare
5. normal shutdown procedure of the turboset after 3 min,
slow trip, which consists of:
nuÞna obustava rada turboseta nakon 3 min koju èine:
5.1. closing the steam inlet valve for steam turbine.
zatvaranje ulaznog ventila pare za parnu turbinu
5.2. opening the relief valve of air compressor to the atmosphere
otvaranje ventila za rastereæenje zraènog kompresora
prema atmosferi
5.3. opening the relief valve of nitrous gas compressor
to the atmosphere
otvaranje ventila za rastereæenje kompresora dušikovih oksida
prema atmosferi
5.4. closing the inlet valve for tail gas turbine
zatvaranje ulaznog ventila za plinski ekspander
5.5. opening the by-pass valve of tail gas turbine for its relief
otvaranje obilaznog ventila za rastereæenje plinskog
ekspandera
6. closing of the control valve of the liquid ammonia for the
DeNOx system – the cause marked with ** triggers only this
effect
zatvaranje kontrolnog ventila tekuæeg amonijaka za sustav
za uklanjanje NOx – uzrok oznaèen s ** izaziva samo ovu
posljedicu
high pressure of gaseous ammonia after ammonia evaporator
visok tlak plinovitog amonijaka nakon isparivaèa amonijaka
low pressure of air for the oxidation with gaseous ammonia
nizak tlak zraka za oksidaciju s plinovitim amonijakom
malfunction of the boiler feed water recirculation jackets
of the burners
kvar u cirkulaciji kotlovske vode za vodene dÞepove reaktora
malfunction of boiler recirculation feed water in the boiler
kvar u cirkulaciji napojne vode za kotao
very high level of nitric acid in the separator before the inlet
of nitrous gas compressor
vrlo visoka razina dušiène kiseline u odvajaèu prije ulaza
u kompresor dušikovih oksida
low pressure of cooling water
nizak tlak rashladne vode
low pressure of instrumental air
nizak tlak instrumentnog zraka
high temperature of catalytic gauzes
visoka temperatura katalizatorskih mreÞa
normal STOP pushbutton in the control room
tipkalo STOP za normalnu obustavu u komandnoj sobi
normal STOP pushbutton on the local control panel of turboset
tipkalo STOP za normalnu obustavu na lokalnoj kontrolnoj ploèi
turboseta
low temperature of tail gas before the DeNOx reactor**
niska temperatura otpadnog plina prije reaktora
za uklanjanje NOx**
low temperature of tail gas after the tailgas turbine**
niska temperatura otpadnog plina nakon plinskog ekspandera**N. ZEÈEVIÆ et al.: Nitric Acid Revamp and Upgrading of the Alarm & Protection Safety System, Kem. Ind. 61 (4) 205–214 (2012) 209
Table 4 – List of the alarm states, interlocks and trips for common situations and for each production line separately
Tablica 4 – Popis zajednièkih i pojedinih uzbunjujuæih stanja, meðustanja i blokirajuæih stanja na postrojenju
za proizvodnju dušiène kiseline
Possible alarms, trips and interlocks
Moguæi alarmi, meðustanja i blokadna stanja
Processing of the alarms, trips and
interlocks
Obrada alarma, meðustanja
i blokadnih stanja
low and high level of liquid ammonia in the ammonia evaporator
niska i visoka razina tekuæeg amonijaka u isparivaèu amonijaka
audio and visual warnings with the
necessary information as:
zvuèna i vidljiva upozorenja s
neophodnim informacijama izraÞena kao:
1. alarm condition
uzbunjujuæi uvjet
2. part of the plant affected
dio ugroÞenog postrojenja
3. description of the required action
opis potrebne preventivne radnje
4. alarm priority
prvenstvo uzbune
5. time of alarm
vrijeme uzbune
6. status of alarm
stanje uzbune
7. grouping and first-up alarms
grupiranje prvih uzbuna
8. eclipsing the lower grade alarms (e.g.
suppression of the high alarm when
the high-high activates)
potiskivanje uzbuna manje vaÞnosti
(npr. gašenje uzbuna velike vaÞnosti
kada se ukljuèi uzbuna vrlo velike
vaÞnosti)
9. suppression of the out-of-service plant
alarms
gašenje alarma ako postrojenje ne radi
10. suppression of the selected alarms
during certain operating modes
gašenje odabranih uzbuna tijekom
odreðenih naèina rada
11. automatic alarm load shedding and
shelving
automatsko popunjavanje
uzbunjujuæih stanja
low temperature of gaseous ammonia after ammonia evaporator
niska temperatura plinovitog amonijaka nakon isparivaèa amonijaka
high temperature of high pressure steam after heat superheater
visoka temperatura visokotlaène pare nakon pregrijaèa pare
clogging of oil filter in the turboset oil system
zaèepljenje uljnog filtra u uljnom sustavu turboseta
high temperature of oil in the turboset oil system
visoka temperatura ulja u uljnom sustavu turboseta
high level of condensate in the steam turbine condenser
visoka razina kondenzata u kondenzatoru parne turbine
low pressure of instrumental air
nizak tlak instrumentnog zraka
low temperature of catalytic gauzes in the burners
niska temperatura katalizatorskih mreÞa u gorionicima
low and high level of boiler feed water in the steam drum
niska i visoka razina kotlovske vode u parnom domu
low and high level of nitric acid in the bleaching tower
niska i visoka razina dušiène kiseline u koloni za bijeljenje
low level of nitric acid in the oxidation tower
niska razina dušiène kiseline u koloni za oksidaciju
high level of nitric acid in the separator at the inlet of nitrous gas compressor
visoka razina dušiène kiseline u odvajaèu na ulazu u kompresor dušiènih plinova
low and high level of nitric acid in the absorption tower
niska/visoka razina dušiène kiseline u koloni za apsorpciju
low/high level of nitric acid in the condenser of the weak nitric acid
niska/visoka razina dušiène kisline u kondenzatoru razrijeðene dušiène kiseline
low volume flow of demineralised water for the absorption tower
mali protok demineralizirane vode u koloni za apsorpciju
low pressure of high and low pressure steam
nizak tlak visokotlaène ili niskotlaène pare
low level of boiler feed water in the deaerator
niska razina kotlovne vode u otplinjaèu
low and high level of nitric acid in the nitric acid storage reservoirs
niska/visoka razina dušiène kiseline u spremnicima dušiène kiseline
malfunction of the boiler feed steam pump
kvar crpke kotlovne vode
malfunction of nitric acid pump for end users
kvar crpke dušiène kiseline za krajnje korisnike
malfunction of nitric acid circulation pump through the oxidation tower
kvar crpke za cirkulaciju dušiène kiseline u koloni za oksidaciju
malfunction of the extraction pump for weak nitric acid from the weak
nitric acid condenser
kvar crpke za crpljenje razrijeðene dušiène kiseline iz kondenzatora razrijeðene dušiène kiseline
malfunction of the extraction pump for the condensate from the steam turbine condenser
kvar crpke za crpljenje kondenzata iz kondenzatora parne turbine
malfunction of the boiler feed water circulation pump
kvar crpke za cirkulaciju kotlovne vode
malfunction of the nitric acid circulation pump through absorption tower
kvar crpke za cirkulaciju dušiène kiseline kroz kolonu za apsorpciju
malfunction of the demineralised water pump for absorption tower
kvar crpke demineralizirane vode
low and high temperature of all process streams (air, ammonia, nitric acid, steam, etc.)
niska/visoka temperatura u svim procesnim tokovima (zrak, amonijak,
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Fig . 1 – Constructed logical diagram of the alarm safety system in the nitric acid production of Petrokemija d. d.
Slika 1– Izvedeni logièki dijagram uzbunjujuæe-sigurnosno-blokirajuæeg sustava u proizvodnji dušiène kiseline Petrokemije d. d.number of order-of-magnitude decreases in either the con-
sequence severity or likelihood of the unwanted accident
that are required. The required risk reduction was typically
accomplished using a combination of instrumented and
non-instrumented safeguards. In order to find out what
amount of risk reduction was required from the safety in-
strumented function, one must know the total amount of
risk reduction provided by the other protection layers. This
was accomplished by summing the number of independent
protectionlayersthatwereavailabletopreventthehazard.
An independent protection layer was defined as a specific
safeguarding category. Independent protection layers were
evaluated and must meet all the following criteria to be uti-
lized in the SIL selection process:
Specificity – An independent protection layer must be spe-
cifically designed to prevent the consequences of one po-
tentially hazardous event.
Independence – The operation of the protection layer must
be completely independent from all other protection
layers, no common equipment can be shared with other
protection layers.
Dependability – The device must be able to dependably
prevent the consequence from occurring. Both systematic
and random faults need to be considered in its design. The
probability of failure of an independent protection layer
must be demonstrated to be less than 10 %.
Audit ability – The device should be proof tested and main-
tained. These audits of operation are necessary to ensure
that the specified level of risk reduction is being achieved.
Some common independent layers of protection utilized
on the project included: coaxial piping systems, relief val-
ves, check valves, electromagnetic valves and operator re-
sponse. Once the independent protection layers were
identified, the total number of protection layers represents
theamountofriskreductionthatwasprovidedbynon-safe-
ty instrumented system means. The difference between the
risk reduction provided by the independent protection
layers and the required risk reduction that was determined
from Table 4 and Fig. 2 is the risk reduction contribution
that must be provided by the safety instrumented function.
The SIL that is assigned to a safety instrumented function
protecting against a specific hazard is then the difference
between the required risk reduction determined from the
pre-safeguard risk ranking and the number of independent
protection layers:
SIL = required risk – number of independent
reduction protection layers
If the SIL calculated using the equation above is either zero
or negative, then a safety instrumented function was not re-
quired for risk reduction purposes. If the calculated SIL was
greater than 2, then it was felt that an expert should review
the scenario. In Table 5 the values of the determined safety
instrumented functions are given, from which the safety in-
tegrity level of the nitric acid process at Petrokemija was de-
termined with the help of the risk graph technique presen-
ted in Fig. 2.
According to the determined safety instrumented functions
from Table 5 and risk graph in Fig. 2, it can be concluded
that in the nitric acid production at Petrokemija d. d. the sa-
fety integrity level is 1. This means that the probability of
failure on demand is between 10–2 and 10–1 per year with
risk reduction factor between 10 to 100.13
Based on the constructed logical diagram, determined safe-
ty integrity level, numbers of the digital and analog outputs
and inputs, necessary electrical power supply and operator
interfaceforachievingthebestalarmprocessingconditions,
the Simatic PCS 7 system was chosen to replace the old
electrical relay safety and transistorized alarm system. The
chosen alarm safety system implemented the safety cau-
se&effects matrix. The cause&effect method has proven to
be an extremely effective option for the description of safe-
ty functions and definition of marginal and shutdown con-
ditions. The method specified by the American Petroleum
Institute in the API RP 14C guideline, is currently employed
inmanysectorsoftheprocessingindustry.Thesafetymatrix
can manage the safety applications up to level 3, in accor-
dance with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. Therefore, it is
obvious that the chosen system can be applied to every in-
dustrial process, which must fulfil safety requirements up to
integrity level 3.
The base of the new system consists only of the necessary
hardware and software platform for the implementation of
all foreseen scenarios according to the previously described
procedure. All process security conditions from tables 2, 3
and 4 and Fig. 1, were implemented in the safety cause&ef-
fect matrix, which is the basis of the new alarm safety sy-
stem. Besides the main highlights and advantages of the sa-
fety matrix, the most acceptable condition for Petrokemija
d. d. was the recognition of the first alarm responsible for
the shutdown sequence, regardless of whether it begins
with the emergency or normal shutdown procedure. Anot-
her very challenging demand and request was the imple-
mentation of the software solution for switching of indivi-
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Table 5 – Description of the determined safety instrumen-
ted functions in the nitric acid production at Petrokemija d. d.
Tablica 5 – Odreðene vrijednosti sigurnosnih instrumentnih
funkcija u proizvodnji dušiène kiseline u Petrokemiji d. d.
Vrijednost sigurnosne
instrumentne funkcije
Category of safety
instrumented function
Opis
Description
C2
no-lost-time injury or occupational
illness
zabiljeÞene ozljede ili profesionalna
oboljenja, bez izgubljena vremena
W4
expected to occur frequently
(e.g. once a month)
oèekivanje da se èesto pojavljuju
(npr. jedanput mjeseèno)
F1
rare to more frequent exposure
in the hazardous zone
rijetko do uèestalo izlaganje
u opasnoj zoni
P1
possible under certain conditions
moguæe pod odreðenim uvjetimadual process causes during the start-up procedure, which
were originally solved through the hardware by-pass. Na-
mely, during the start-up procedure, some of the possible
process causes from Table 3 must be by-passed until the
proper process conditions are accomplished. It is allowed
to switch off the by-pass of the causes and put their function
into the alarm safety system to trigger the protection effect,
only after reaching adequate process values of the corre-
sponding process causes. The problem was solved by han-
dling of by-pass conditions as easy as possible in a way that
the original hardware switching operator interface was co-
pied to the virtual one, taking all the advantages of the soft-
ware tool and safety cause&effect matrix. In the installation
and commissioning phase, the old alarm safety system was
replaced, which involved the following:
1. Replacement of the 110 V uninterrupted power supply
with a new one of 230 V AC;
2. Replacement of the 230 V AC to 110 V DC power supply
with that of 230 V AC to 24 V DC:
3. Replacement of all 110 V DC electrical solenoids with
those of 24 V DC, approved by the EX Agency;
4. Replacement of the electrical relay safety system with the
Simatic PCS 7 AS 417-FH redundant system;
5. Replacement of the Praxis transistorized alarm system
with the Simatic PCS 7 AS 417-FH redundant system;
6.Installationofthefailsafe“yellow”I/Omodulesforthedi-
gital/analog outputs and inputs of the process variables;
7. Installation of the standard I/O modules for the digi-
tal/analog inputs and outputs of the process variables, inclu-
ding EX protection;
8. Replacement of all electrical supplies (wirings, fuses,
communication cables, etc.);
9. Software programming of the safety matrix with all pos-
sible causes and effects;
10. Configuration of the engineering/operator and operator
stations (connection with the redundant CPU, failsafe “yel-
low” and standard I/O modules for the digital and analog
inputs and outputs, defining the operator interface in the
shape of process diagrams, alarm and working groups);
11. Connection of the erected system with the process safe-
ty equipment in the process field.
Theblockschemeofthenewlyinstalledalarmsafetysystem
is presented in Fig. 3. From Fig. 3 it can be seen that the
control room was equipped with two control stations for
operator interface, of which one is an engineering&opera-
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C1
W1
F1
F2
P1
P2
C2
C3
C4
F1
F2
F1
F2
P1
P2
P1
P2
P1
P2
W2 W3 W4
2 3 4 5
Start
2 3 4 1
2 3 1 a
2 1 a
1 a
a
– pre-safeguard likelihood parameter
– parametar vjerojatnosti predzaštite
– consequence parameter
– parametar posljedice
– no safety requirements
– bez sigurnosnih zahtjeva
– occupancy parameter
– parametar trajanja
– no special safety requirements
– bez posebnih sigurnosnih zahtjeva
– probability of avoidance parameter
– parametar vjerojatnosti izbjegavanja
W
P
F
a
C
Fig . 2 – Risk graph for determination of safety integrity level (SIL) from safety instrumented functions (SIF). C1 – no injury or occupatio-
nal illness, first aid; C2 – no-lost-time injury or occupational illness; C3 – lost-time injury or occupational illness; C4 – death or severe occu-
pational illness; W1 – not expected to occur during plant lifetime; W2 – expected to occur several times during plant lifetime; W3 –
expected to occur once a year; W4 – expected to occur frequently (once a month); F1 – rare to more frequent exposure in the hazardous
zone; F2 – frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone; P1 – possible under certain conditions; P2 – almost impossible.
Slika 2– Odreðivanje sigurnosne razine integriteta grafom rizika te sigurnosnim instrumentnim funkcijama. C1 – nema ozljeda ili profe-
sionalnih oboljenja, prva pomoæ; C2 – zabiljeÞene ozljede ili profesionalna oboljenja bez izgubljena vremena; C3 – ozljede i profesionalna
oboljenja s izgubljenim vremenom; C4 – smrt ili teška profesionalna oboljenja; W1 – ne oèekuje se pojava tijekom radnog vijeka postroje-
nja; W2 – oèekuje se pojava nekoliko puta tijekom radnog vijeka postrojenja; W3 – oèekuje se pojava jedanput godišnje; W4 – uèestalo
pojavljivanje (jedanput mjeseèno); F1 – rijetko ili èesto izlaganje u opasnom podruèju; F2 – uèestalo do stalno izlaganje u opasnom
podruèju; P1 – moguæe pod odreðenim uvjetima; P2 – gotovo nemoguæe.tor station, while the other is only an operator station. The
stations are connected through the industrial ethernet with
two redundant central process units AS417H/F. The CPU is
connected through redundant profibus with four ET200M
modules, of which one is a failsafe module and other three
are normal modules for digital and analog input and output
of process parameters. After the installation and commissio-
ning phase, the phase of cold and real testing of the newly
derived alarm safety system followed. The phase of cold
and real testing was divided into three steps. The first step
was to check the emergency shutdown procedure, the se-
cond step was to check the normal shutdown procedure,
whereas the third step was to check the alarm states, trips
and interlocks of the process parameters (temperatures, le-
vels)andprocessequipment(pumps,reliefvalves).Allthree
mentioned steps were conducted simultaneously for cold
and real conditions. The testing procedure of the alarm sa-
fety system consisted of the start-up of every possible cause
listed in Table 2 and Table 3 and the logical diagram in Fig.
1, followed by checking, with the help of the derived safety
cause&effectmatrix,whetherthiscausetriggeredtheneces-
sary protection effect prescribed by the logical diagram. Ve-
rificationofthetriggeredprotectioneffectwasalsochecked
through appropriate action of the safety process equipment
in the process field. During the phase of testing, the occur-
renceofthefirstalarm,responsiblefortheshutdownproce-
dure,wasalsoverified.Bythesamemethodology,testingof
all possible prescribed alarm states, interlocks and trips li-
sted in Table 4 was conducted. All the tested causes and
alarms triggered audio and visual warnings with the opera-
tion of all necessary actions in accordance with the EEMUA
191 – Alarm systems – a guide to design, management and
procurement. The whole derived system was also tested
against random hardware faults to check the redundant
function of the central process unit and operator interface.
After testing, the phase of training and familiarizing the pro-
cess staff with the new alarm safety system followed. The
process staff, consisting of 20 operators of an average age of
51.2 years, had no experience with any other kind of mi-
croprocessor alarm safety or control system, either old or
new generation. Therefore, the training was very challen-
ging, but owing to the very friendly environment of the new
system, especially the protection cause&effect matrix and
the excellent knowledge of the nitric acid process, training
was completed very successfully. A minor disadvantage of
the new alarm safety system was overcome during the te-
sting and training phase. Except for the commissioning of
the alarm system, the foundations for the second phase of
replacing the existing pneumatic control system with a mo-
dern one were also laid, using transformation of the current
signal (4 to 20 mA) to pneumatic force for the movement of
control valves. On this basis and with regard to the necessa-
ry conditions in the process field, the two cascade PID con-
trol circuits for managing the DeNOx system were imple-
mented. The control system consists of a control valve and
Coriolismagneticflow-meterfordosingtheliquidammonia
and continuous analysis of the NOx volume concentration
in the tail gases.
The entire project, from analysis to erection, commissio-
ning, testing, validation and training lasted approximately
one year, and was conducted by Petrokemija's process and
maintenance staff. The phase of erection, testing and trai-
ning was conducted in January 2011, lasting 25 working
days, with the newly installed alarm system. Both produc-
tion lines have been running successfully since the begin-
ning of February 2011, with no malfunctions of the con-
structed alarm safety logic or/and equipment.
Conclusion
In accordance with good engineering practice, the revam-
ping and upgrading of the existing alarm safety system with
a new microprocessor system was conducted in the nitric
acid production at Petrokemija d. d. The entire project was
implemented in three phases, i.e. analysis and testing pha-
se, implementation phase, and operation and maintenance
phase. With the constructed architecture of the logical dia-
gram of the nitric acid process, the minimum required safe-
ty integrity level was determined with the help of the safety
instrumented functions and a risk graph technique. On this
basis, a new alarm safety system was chosen, in the form of
the Simatic PCS 7 system with the safety cause&effect ma-
trix. Replacement of the electrical relay safety system and
the transistorized alarm system with a microprocessor sy-
stem was implemented using own know-how with the su-
pervision of Siemens Croatia. The newly installed system
was successfully tested and verified in accordance with the
determined safety requirements and put into real process
conditions with no malfunction. The proposed system of te-
sting performance of the erected alarm safety system on the
logical diagram basis, may serve its implementation in other
nitric acid plants. The successful execution of the alarm sa-
fetysystemalsolaidthefoundationsforthesecondphaseof
revampingandupgradingofthenitricacidprocessinPetro-
kemija d. d. in the segment of replacing the existing pneu-
matic control system with a microprocessor system of the
last generation.
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Fig . 3 – Main hardware architecture of the newly installed
alarm safety system SIMATIC PCS 7
Slika 3– Izvedena arhitektura novopostavljenog uzbunjujuæe-
-sigurnosno-blokirajuæeg sustava Simatic PCS 7List of abbreviations
Popis kratica
CPU – central process unit
– središnja procesorska jedinica
DCS – distributed control system
– raspodijeljeni sustav upravljanja
EX – explosive
– eksplozivno
I/O – input/output
– ulaz/izlaz
SIL – safety integrity level
– razina cjelovitosti sigurnosti
SIF – safety instrumented function
– instrumentna sigurnosna funkcija
P&I – process&instrumental
– procesno & instrumentno
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SAÝETAK
Poboljšanje i nadogradnja uzbunjujuæe-sigurnosno-blokirajuæeg sustava
u proizvodnji dušiène kiseline Petrokemije d. d.
N. Zeèeviæ,a* I. Hoškoa i S. Pavlakoviæb
Svakom industrijskom procesu, osobito kemijskom, potrebno je posvetiti posebnu paÞnju s obzi-
rom na sigurnosne zahtjeve. Zbog toga se proizvodni procesi trebaju kontinuirano pratiti kontrol-
nim i uzbunjujuæe-sigurnosno-blokirajuæim sustavima. U proizvodnji dušiène kiseline Petrokemije
d. d. izvorni uzbunjujuæe-sigurnosno-blokirajuæi sustav bio je izveden u obliku elektrièno-re-
lejnog sigurnosno-blokirajuæeg sustava i tranzistorskog uzbunjujuæeg sustava. Radi poveæanja
sigurnosnih zahtjeva i poboljšanja postojeæeg uzbunjujuæe-sigurnosno-blokirajuæeg sustava pro-
vedena je nadogradnja postojeæeg s novim mikroprocesorskim sustavom. Novi uzbunjujuæe-si-
gurnosno-blokirajuæi sustav, Simatic PCS 7, povezuje funkcije klasiènih logièkih kontrolnih
sustava s uzbunjujuæe-sigurnosno-blokirajuæim funkcijama u zajednièku bazu kako bi se zado-
voljili minimalne sigurnosne norme do razina sigurnosnih integriteta 2i3sobzirom na standarde
IEC 61508 i IEC 61511. Prikazan je pristup nadogradnje logike uzbunjujuæe-sigurnosno-bloki-
rajuæeg sustava u proizvodnji dušiène kiseline u obliku logièkog dijagrama koji je bio osnova za
daljnje izvoðenje radova. Na temelju izraðenog logièkog dijagrama i definiranih sigurnosnih
zahtjeva,projektjeprovedenutrifazekojesubilefazaanalizeitestiranja,ugradnjenoveopreme
te puštanje u pogon cijelog izvedenog sustava. Razvijen je sustav provjere svih sigurnosno-blo-
kirajuæih uvjeta, koji se moÞe primijeniti i na druga postrojenja za proizvodnju dušiène kiseline.
S obnovljenim i nadograðenim uzbunjujuæe-sigurnosno-blokirajuæim sustavom postavljene su
nove poboljšane sigurnosne granice te je osigurana osnova za daljnje unaprjeðenje proizvodnog
procesa.
a Petrokemija d. d., Proizvodnja gnojiva, Prispjelo 30. svibnja 2011.
Kutina, Hrvatska Prihvaæeno 16. prosinca 2011.
b Siemens d. d. Zagreb, Hrvatska